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UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: How SHOULD CONGRESS PLAY
THE BALL?
INTRODUCTION
"Like the proverbial road to hell, the path to the Guidelines was
paved with good intentions."' These good intentions, however, could not
stop the Supreme Court from finding that the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines ("Guidelines") 2 were unconstitutional in certain applications in light
of the Sixth Amendment . In United States v. Booker,4 the Supreme
Court held that the federal judicial practice of using facts the jury did not
consider to increase the statutory maximum sentence of an offender was
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.5 The Court held that "any
fact (other than prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sen-
tence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a
plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.",
6
The Court first whispered the concept of this inevitable holding in
Jones v. United States7 in 1999.8 In Jones, the Supreme Court hinted at
the unconstitutionality of judicial fact-finding under the Sixth Amend-
ment.9 In the federal system, a judge may determine a fact by a prepon-
derance of the evidence and impose a sentence higher than the prescribed
1. Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345, 354 (2005) (citing Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Cri-
tique of Federal Sentencing, POL'Y ANALYSIS, Nov. 1, 2002, at 3,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa458.pdf).
2. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2005), http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf The
Guidelines were created to provide judges with "fair and consistent sentencing ranges to consult at
sentencing." Id. at 2. They are based on two main criteria: the seriousness of the crime charged and
the defendant's criminal history. Id. There are forty-three levels for crimes and six categories for
criminal history. Id. These two factors intersect on a table, which contains a range of time in which
the judge can sentence the offender. Id. The top of each range exceeds the bottom by six months or
25%, whichever is greater. Id.
3. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005); The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
5. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 755-56.
6. Id. at 756.
7. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
8. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
9. Id.
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sentencing range.10 The Supreme Court fully addressed whether this
practice was constitutional in Apprendi v. New Jersey" in 2000, but the
decision only applied to the constitutionality of a state statute. 12  The
Court applied the holding of Apprendi to state statutory maximums in
Ring v. Arizona; 3 and in 2004, the Court applied the same reasoning to
Washington's sentencing guidelines.' 4 Until January of 2005, the ques-
tion was still unanswered as to whether the Apprendi holding applied to
the Guidelines. 5
By 2005, the Booker Court's constitutionality holding (the "Stevens
majority") 16 was not much of a shock. The shock came when a different
majority (the "Breyer majority") 7 of the Court revealed their remedy to
this application of the Sixth Amendment.' 8 The Breyer majority held
that, in line with Congress' supposed intent, it had to sever and excise
provisions of the Guidelines in order to keep the Guidelines constitu-
tional; thus the Breyer majority made the Guidelines advisory. 9 The
remedy was "a remarkable act of judicial jujitsu.',
20
The Breyer majority's decision has left Congress with an advisory
guideline system. 2 1 Although this remedy was astounding and unex-
pected,22 it offers Congress a chance to analyze the system in its current
state and determine what course of action to take.23 Accordingly, Part I
of this Comment explains the history and case law that led up to Booker.
Part II outlines the two majority opinions of Booker and the multiple
dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the situation of the post-Booker
sentencing system. This Part explains why the current advisory system is
not Congress' best option and why Congress should change it. Part III
also describes the three realistic options for Congress: (1) a Booker-ized
Guideline system that would allow juries to determine sentencing factors
needed to increase the sentence above the Guideline range; (2) a complex
10. See Frank 0. Bowman, 111, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Struc-
tural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1315, 1326 (2005).
11. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (finding "other than the fact of prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
12. Id. at 468-69.
13. 536 U.S. 584, 589 (1999).
14. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004).
15. See David Yellen, Saving Federal Sentencing Reform After Apprendi, Blakely and
Booker, 50 VILL. L. REv. 163, 171 (2005).
16. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
17. Id at 756.
18. Id; See Steven G. Kalar et al., A Booker Advisory: Into the Breyer Patch, CHAMPION,
Mar. 2005, at 8, 10.
19. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764; See also, Kalar, supra note 18, at 11.
20. Kalar, supra note 18, at 11 ((quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Breyer Review: The Court's Fancy
Footwork, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2005, at 10, 10) quoting Prof Frank 0. Bowman's assessment of
the Breyer Majority).
21. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757.
22. Kalar, supra note 18, at 10.
23. See Gardina, supra note 1, at 388-89.
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charge system that turns all possible sentencing factors into elements of
the crime; or (3) a simple charge system where each crime has one sen-
tence and the judge could use mitigating factors to individualize a sen-
tence. 24 Finally, this Comment will compare Congress' options and ex-
plain why a bifurcated jury system is the best option.
I. BACKGROUND
Two decades ago, the United States experienced a major sentencing
reform.25 Rising crime rates, lack of evidence of prisoner rehabilitation,
and extensive sentencing disparity were the major factors that induced
this reform.26 The Guidelines were fully in place for about sixteen
27years. In the last six years, however, beginning with Jones v. United
States,28 the Supreme Court began to question the constitutionality of
judicial fact-finding used to increase a defendant's maximum punish-
ment.29 A majority/minority split that persisted throughout the subse-
quent cases originated from Jones.30 The four pre-Booker cases discuss-
ing the issue establish strong precedent for the Stevens majority's hold-
ing in Booker,3 1 but none of the parties or amici suggested the Breyer
majority's remedy.32
A. Sentencing Reform
Critics in the legal community have been debating for decades over
ways to eliminate disparate sentencing in the federal system.33 Prior to
1984, the Federal Government used a system of indeterminate sentenc-
ing.34 In the indeterminate sentencing system, statutes specified penalties
for each crime, but judges had discretion to decide the true length of the
sentence. 35  To complement judicial discretion, Congress used parole
boards to evaluate each offender and determine the length of each of-
fender's sentence.36 Once the parole board released an offender, a parole
24. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2554-58.
25. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:
AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM iv (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_yearstudy full.pdf
(hereinafter Fifteen Years).
26. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1322-23.
27. Fifteen Years, supra note 25, at iv.
28. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
29. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
30. In Jones, the majority consisted of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg
while the minority consisted of Justices Breyer, O'Connor, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id.
at 229.
31. Susan R. Klein, Shifting Powers in the Federal Courts: The Return of Federal Judicial
Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 714 (2005).
32. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 771 (2005).
33. See Yellen, supra note 15, at 165-66.
34. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
35. Id.
36. Id.
2005]
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officer would supervise him or her.37 Congress based this system upon
the theory of rehabilitation.38 If prison could rehabilitate an offender, his
or her risk of recidivism would decrease. 39 Sentence disparity was, how-
ever, too common.4 ° Offenders that committed the same crime and had
similar criminal histories received widely different sentences and served
different amounts of their sentences.4 In one extreme example, a sen-
tencing judge would ask the convicted offender how many people were
in the courtroom that day.42 After the offender had counted, the judge
would sentence the offender to the same number of years as there were
people in the courtroom.43 This type of arbitrary sentencing angered the
public and many members of the legal community.44
As crime and recidivism rates were stagnant or increasing, and sen-
tence disparity was rampant, the theory of rehabilitation fell out of fa-
vor.45 In the 1980's, Congress began to consider a mandatory guideline
system based on determinate sentencing.46 In 1984, Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act ("Act")47 that created the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission ("Commission").48 Congress gave the Commission the
task of creating a mandatory sentencing guideline, which all federal
judges would follow. 49 Congress gave the Commission three goals: (1)
to "assure the meeting of purposes of sentencing as set forth" in the
Act; 50 (2) to "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defen-
dants with similar records;" and (3) to "reflect to the extent practicable,
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the crimi-
37. Id.
38. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1321. Rehabilitation aims to reform the criminal into a law-
abiding citizen through different programs like drug and alcohol rehabilitation, and G.E.D. classes.
See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Pur-
pose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1313, 1316-19 (2000). "This model held that,
through ... personal renewal spurred by counseling, drug treatment, job training and the like, crimi-
nal deviance could be treated like any other disorder." Bowman, supra note 10, at 1321.
39. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363.
40. Id at 365.
41. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2544 (2004).
42. Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 394
(2005).
43. Id.
44. See Id. at 394-95.
45. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1322.
46. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365-67.
47. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2005).
48. Peter B. Krupp, The Return of Judicial Discretion: Federal Sentencing Under "Advisory"
Guidelines After United States v. Booker, 49 B. B.J. 18, 18 (2005); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
28 U.S.C. § 991 (2005).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 991; See also Yellen, supra note 15, at 167.
50. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2005)). The four purposes of the
Act were: (1) "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense;" (2) "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;" (3) "to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;" and (4) "to provide the defendants with
needed... correctional treatment." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2005)).
[Vol. 83:2
2005] BOOKER V. WASHINGTON
nal justice process.",5' Although the Act eliminated much of sentencing
disparity, it certainly did not meet all of the specified goals. 52 The Act
greatly diminished the number of offenders sentenced to probation and
doubled the average time an offender spent incarcerated. 53  Therefore,
the Commission did not achieve its purpose of "just punishment. 54  In
addition, recidivism rates have not dropped,55 and federal prisons do not
emphasize correctional treatment.56 Nonetheless, Congress kept the
Act.57 In 1999, however, the issue of whether a specific aspect of the
Guidelines was constitutional in light of the Sixth Amendment sur-
faced.58
B. Background Cases
1. Jones v. United States
In Jones, the Court faced the issue of whether to construe a federal
carjacking statute59 as three separate crimes or as one crime with three
maximum penalties.60 Based on facts the jury found beyond a reasonable
61doubt, the defendant's maximum possible sentence was fifteen years.
In spite of this, the presentence report62 recommended a twenty-five-year
sentence due to "serious bodily injury" of one victim. 63 The major point
of distinction in Jones was whether a sentencing factor and an element of
51. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2005)).
52. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1326-28.
53. Yellen, supra note 15, at 183.
54. See Bowman, supra note 10, at 1328-29.
55. PATRICK A. LANGDON & DAVID J. LEVIN, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994,
NCJ 193427 1, 1 (June 2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf ("Among nearly
300,000 prisoners released in 15 States in 1994, 67.5% were rearrested within 3 years. A study of
1983 releases estimated 62.5%.").
56. See Steven Belenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment Into the Criminal
Justice Process, 63 ALB. L. REV. 833, 855-56 (2000).
57. See Hon. John S. Martin, Jr., The Role of the Departure Power in Reducing Injustice and
Unwarranted Disparity Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 259, 268 (2000).
58. Jones, 526 U.S. at 248.
59. The statute states:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that
has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the per-
son or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so,
shall - (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, (2) if
serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title, including any conduct that,
if the conduct occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, would violate section 2241 or 2242 of this title) results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and (3) if death results, be fined under this ti-
tle or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1998).
60. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
61. Id. at 230-31.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (2005) ("A United States probation officer shall make a presentence
investigation of a defendant that is required pursuant to the provisions of Rule 32(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and shall, before the imposition of sentence, report the results of the
investigation to the court.").
63. Jones, 526 U.S. at 231.
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a crime were two different names for the same thing, or distinct from
each other.64
The majority decided that if it were to construe the statute as one
crime, the defendant's sentence could have raised Sixth Amendment
issues of whether a jury should determine all facts that increase the
maximum penalty for an offender. 65 "The point is simply that diminish-
ment of the jury's significance by removing control over facts determin-
ing a statutory sentencing range would resonate with the claims of earlier
controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet set-
tled., 66 Therefore, the majority construed the statute as three separate
offenses in order to avoid the Sixth Amendment issue.6 7
The minority strongly disagreed in Jones.68  Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Breyer and Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that there was a
definite difference between an element of a crime and a sentencing fac-
tor.69 The minority thought that there was no need to even mention con-
stitutionality in the holding.7° Justice Kennedy's dissent aptly predicted
that this holding would "cause disruption and uncertainty in the sentenc-
ing system[] .. '..,,7' The Court avoided the constitutional issue first
raised in Jones and instead left it for future resolution.
2. Apprendi v. New Jersey72
Like the defendant in Jones, the defendant in Apprendi faced an
elongated sentence based on a judge's determination.73 In Apprendi, the
petitioner pled guilty to multiple counts involving firearms. 74 After ac-
cepting the guilty plea, the judge concluded that the crime was "moti-
vated by racial bias., 75 This finding increased the petitioner's sentence
for that specific count from a possible five to ten years, to exactly twelve
years.76 The petitioner appealed the sentence77 and the Court had an op-
portunity to answer the question foreshadowed by Jones.78 The Court
held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that in-
creases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed... maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt., 79 The
64. Id. at 232.
65. Id. at 251-52.
66. Id. at 248.
67. Id. at 251-52.
68. Id. at 255 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 254.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 271.
72. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
73. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
74. Id. at 469-70.
75. Id. at 471.
76. Id. at 471.
77. Id. at 471.
78. Id. at 476.
79. Id. at 490.
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Court also cleared up doubt by reiterating that a sentencing factor and an
element of a crime are no different; only a legislative choice places an
aspect of the crime or offender in one category or the other. 80
The Court was also split 5-4 in this opinion.8' Justice O'Connor
called the majority opinion "meaningless formalism." 82 Justice Breyer
questioned how the Court could expect a defendant to prove his inno-
cence while at the same time disproving any factor that would lead to a
sentencing increase.83 This type of defense would lead to statements
such as, "I did not sell drugs, but I sold no more than 500 grams. 84
Congress' only probable solution would be bifurcated jury processes in
which one stage would determine if the accused had committed a crime
and the other stage would determine the veracity of facts that would in-
crease or decrease the offender's sentence.85 Justice Breyer also pointed
out that in some cases, there are just too many factors to submit them all
86to the jury. Apprendi left just as many questions unanswered as Jones
as to how far the holding would apply in other situations. The main
question was how and if this holding would affect state and federal sen-
tencing guidelines.87
3. Ring v. Arizona
88
Before addressing the true concerns that arose from the Apprendi
and Jones holdings, the Court addressed the constitutionality of judicial
fact-finding of an aggravating factor that is necessary for the imposition
of the death penalty under the Sixth Amendment. 89 Although the jury
convicted the defendant of a crime that fell within the statutory range of
"death or life imprisonment," and the imposition of the death penalty did
not exceed the statutory maximum, the Arizona murder statute required a
court to find aggravating factors before imposing the death penalty. 90
Because an aggravating factor is still a fact found by the judge that is the
"functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Court held
that a jury must decide the fact-finding necessary to put the defendant to
death.9' This holding was a sidestep that reaffinmed the reasoning the
Court would use to arrive at the holding of Booker.
This case was slightly different from the others in this line of rea-
soning because of the Justices who joined the majority. Justice Kennedy
80. Id. at 476.
81. Id. at 468.
82. Id. at 539 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 544.
88. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
89. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
90. Id. at 603-04.
91. Id. at 609.
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joined the majority, stating in his concurrence that although Apprendi
was wrongly decided, it was now law.92 Even a cautious extension of
Apprendi would result in the majority's holding.93 Justice Breyer also
concurred, but because he believed that "jury sentencing in capital cases
is mandated by the Eighth Amendment." 94 Justice O'Connor and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, however, maintained in their dissent that the holding
in Apprendi was a "serious mistake.
95
4. Blakely v. Washington
96
Blakely was the final step in a series of cases that led to the inevita-
ble holding of Booker. The defendant in Blakely pled guilty to second-
degree kidnapping, which required a sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three
months under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act.97  However, the
Washington guidelines allowed a judge to impose a higher sentence if he
or she found "substantial and compelling reasons justifying an excep-
tional sentence. 9 8 The judge found that the defendant had acted with
"deliberate cruelty" and sentenced the defendant to ninety months.99
In the appeal, the State contended that Apprendi did not apply be-
cause ten years was the statutory maximum for all class B felonies. 00
The Court, however, made clear that the term "statutory maximum" in
Apprendi referred to the maximum sentence "a judge may impose solely
on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the de-
fendant."'' 1  In the defendant's case, the judge could only impose a
higher sentence if he found aggravating factors, not elements of the
crime. 102 In finding such aggravating factors without a jury, the judge
violated the holding from Apprendi. 
103
The Court made sure to express that the "Federal Guidelines are not
before us, and we express no opinion on them."'' 4 This statement did not
keep Justice O'Connor from speculating on the effect of Blakely on the
Guidelines. 1 5  Justice O'Connor noted that Washington's sentencing
scheme was almost identical to the Guidelines and she predicted that
"what I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sen-
92. Id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
96. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
97. The Washington state sentencing guidelines were very similar to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
98. Id. at 2535.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2537.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2538.
104. Id. at 2538 n.4.
105. Id. at 2549-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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tencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judg-
ments are in jeopardy."' 10 6  The majority's holding caused the lower
courts to split into many factions, all with a different opinion on how or
why Blakely applied to the Guidelines. 0 7  Thus, the Supreme Court
granted the Solicitor General's request for expedited review of Booker
and heard arguments for Booker the first day of the term.'08
II. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER10 9
Booker is the culmination of six years of arguments and specula-
tions about the constitutionality of sentencing above the Guidelines
range, based on judicial fact-finding. Justice O'Connor first made note
of the possibility in Apprendi v. New Jersey" 0 and continued to show
concern over how an unconstitutional ruling would affect the Guide-
lines."' The Justices in Booker all stayed on their respective sides for
the constitutionality issue: Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Stevens in the majority, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Breyer in the minority. 112 In that respect, the
Stevens majority holding was not a surprise, as it followed the law set
forth in Apprendi and Blakely. 13  The surprise came from the Breyer
majority, composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg." 4  The Breyer majority produced
complex holdings and left Congress to pick up the pieces. 15
A. Facts
116
The government charged Booker with possession with intent to dis-
tribute at least fifty grams of cocaine base. 17  The jury found Booker
guilty of possessing fifty grams of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. §
106. Id. at 2550.
107. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be Saved?
A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 217, 226-27 (2004)
[hereinafter Train Wreck].
108. Yellen, supra note 15, at 171; Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 219 n.2.
109. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
110. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
111. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
113. Klein, supra note 3 1, at 714.
114. Kalar, supra note 18, at 10.
115. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
116. The case of United States v. Booker also encompassed another defendant in the opposite
position of Booker: Fanfan. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747. The United States charged Fanfan with
conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine. Id.
The maximum sentence for this crime was seventy-five months under the Guidelines. Id. After the
trial, the judge held a sentencing hearing and found by a preponderance of the evidence that Fanfan
had possessed 2.5 kilograms of cocaine and 261.6 grams of crack. Id. In addition, the judge found
that Fanfan had been an organizer or supervisor in the criminal activity. Id. This finding increased
Fanfan's possible sentence to 188 to 235 months, tripling Fanfan's possible sentence. Id. However,
in Fanfan's case, the judge relied on Blakely and determined that he could not increase Fanfan's
maximum penalty but would rely on the jury's guilty verdict to sentence Fanfan. Id.
117. Id. at 746. Cocaine base is also known as crack. Id.
2005]
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841 (a)(1).118 This particular statute provided a minimum sentence of ten
years and a maximum sentence of life." 9 Based upon Booker's criminal
history and the jury conviction, the Guidelines mandated a sentence of
210 to 262 months. 20 Yet, after the jury trial, the judge found by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Booker had actually possessed 566
grams of cocaine base, and was guilty of obstructing justice. 12' This
finding increased Booker's possible sentence to a minimum of 360
months.'22  Thus, the trial judge sentenced Booker to a thirty-year sen-
tence. 1
23
B. Procedural History
124
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Booker's sentence
conflicted with the holdings of Apprendi and Blakely. 125 The court relied
on the holding that "the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."' 26 The court
therefore remanded the case with instructions for the judge to sentence
Booker within the sentencing range or hold a separate sentencing hearing
using a jury. 127 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari for the
case128 and the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.1
29
C. Majority
1. Stevens Majority
The Stevens majority asked whether the "the imposition of an en-
hanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on
the sentencing judge's determination of a fact.., that was not found by
the jury or admitted by the defendant" violated the Sixth Amendment.
30
Based on prior case history and the fact that the Guidelines were manda-
118. id. at 746; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) ("Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful
for any person knowingly or intentionally.., to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance").
119. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. In Fanfan's case, the Government filed for appeal in the First Circuit and filed a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id. at 747. The Court granted the writ and the Supreme Court held
that Fanfan's sentence had not violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 769. The Government, how-
ever, could still seek re-sentencing within the guideline range. Id. The Court, therefore, vacated the
holding and remanded the District Court case. Id. Although Booker actually encompasses two
separate cases, the reasoning the court applied pertains to both situations. Id. at 746.
125. Id. at 746.
126. Id. at 746-47.
127. Id. at 747.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 769.
130. Id. at 747.
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tory and binding on all judges, the Stevens majority found that "the
Guidelines [had] the force and effect of laws."'
31
The Government outlined three arguments detailing why Blakely
should not apply to the Guidelines.' 32 The Stevens majority, however,
found these unpersuasive. 33 First, there was no constitutional signifi-
cance between guidelines a commission created and those the legislature
wrote. 134  Second, the pre-Blakely cases that were inconsistent with
Blakely did not apply in this instance because those cases either were
pre-Guidelines or did not deal with the issue of an increased maximum
sentence due to facts a judge determined. 135 Third, the application of
Blakely to the Guidelines would not unconstitutionally grant legislative
power to the Sentencing Commission.' 36 After refuting the Govern-
ment's arguments, the Stevens majority reaffirmed its holding in Ap-
prendi that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary
to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt."'' The Stevens
majority's constitutional holding left a wound in the Guidelines. If a
judge could not determine facts that led to an increase in the maximum
sentence, how could Congress adapt the Guidelines to comply with this
holding?
2. The Breyer Majority
The Breyer majority did not decide a separate issue but chose a
remedy for the Stevens majority's holding. 138 The remedy, however, was
shocking. 139 The Breyer majority began by listing two options: (1) to
engraft the Booker jury right into the Guidelines or (2) to render the
Guidelines advisory, and therefore not subject to the holding in
Booker. 40 Although the expectation was for the Court to Booker-ize the
Guidelines, the Breyer majority chose the latter remedy.
14
In an eloquent attempt to explain the Breyer majority's reasoning,
the Court argued that an advisory system was in line with Congressional
intent and that a bifurcated jury system had too many problems. 42 First,
the Breyer majority asserted that Congress would prefer an advisory sys-
131. Id. at 750.
132. Id. at 752.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 753-54.
136. Id. at 754-55; See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
137. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
138. Id. at 756.
139. Kalar, supra note 18, at 10.
140. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757.
141. Id.; Kalar, supra note 18, at 10.
142. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 759-64.
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tem to a bifurcated jury system.143 The Breyer majority deciphered Con-
gress' intent by looking at the meaning of words like "court" in the Sen-
tencing Reform Act.' 44 In determining that "the court" meant, "judge
without a jury," the Breyer majority reasoned that taking that sentencing
power away from the judge would deny Congress' intended plan.
45
Second, the Breyer majority explained that Congress' basic goal was to
diminish sentencing disparity and to base punishment on real conduct.
146
Taking sentencing factors out of the judge's determination would un-
dermine the basic aim of the statute of ensuring less sentencing dispar-
ity; 147 although, the Breyer majority never explained how an advisory
system would keep sentencing disparity from arising as a problem again.
Third, the Breyer majority explained that if the Court was to apply
the "grafting" remedy, the system would become too complex. 48 As
brought up in the Apprendi dissent, the Breyer majority asked how the
courts could expect a defendant to prove innocence at the same time as
disproving sentencing factors.149 Fourth, the Breyer majority stated that
plea-bargaining would become worse in a system with the Sixth
Amendment engrafted.150  The skill of counsel and the policies of the
prosecutor would win out over the real conduct of the defendant. 51 The
prosecutor could choose which sentencing factors to use and which to
leave out of the process. 5 2 Again, the majority failed to address the fact
that these issues already came up in the Guidelines. Fifth and finally, the
Breyer majority stated that Congress would not have enacted a system in
which it was easier to adjust the sentence downward than upward.
53
Overall, none of the Breyer majority's reasons were wholly convincing.
In order to render the Guidelines advisory, the Breyer majority ex-
cised certain provisions of the Guidelines. 15 4 The Guidelines could retain
any provision that was constitutionally valid, could function independ-
ently, and was consistent with statutory objectives. 55 The Breyer major-
ity excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) 156 and § 3742(e) 157 as the provisions
143. Id. at 759.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 760.
148. Id. at 761.
149. Id. at 761-62.
150. Id. at 762.
151. Id. at 763.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 764.
155. Id.
156. The statute states:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and
within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described. In determining whether a cir-
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did not meet these criteria. 158 Section 3553(b)(1) was the provision that
made the Guidelines mandatory, and without that section, the Guidelines
no longer fell under the holdings of Apprendi and Blakely.15 9  Section
3742(e) had set forth the standard of review for Guidelines sentences.
160
Without § 3742(e), the Breyer majority found that there was an implied
standard of review of "unreasonable[ness].,, 161 The Breyer majority then
affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision in Booker's case. 62  The Govern-
ment could re-sentence Booker under this holding.
63
D. Dissents
1. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens refuted the arguments the Breyer majority put forth
in their opinion.' 64 Justice Stevens stated that neither the Government,
nor the respondents, nor numerous amici suggested the Breyer majority's
remedy applied. 165  He went further to say that the Breyer majority's
remedy was an exercise of legislative, not judicial power. 1
66
Justice Stevens explained how his chosen remedy of "Booker-izing"
the Guidelines would only affect a very small number of cases.167 First,
only 55% of cases involve sentencing enhancements and only a small
percentage of those cases would involve Sixth Amendment issues.
68
cumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sen-
tencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Com-
mission.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2005)
157. The statute states:
Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence -
(1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect applica-
tion of the sentencing guidelines; (3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and (A)
the district court failed to provide the written statement of reasons required by section
3553(c); (B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor
that - (i) does not advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or (ii) is not au-
thorized under section 3553(b); or (iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or (C) the
sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range, having
regard for the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in section
3553(a) of this title and the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated
by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or (4) was imposed for
an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreason-
able.
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2005)
158. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 765.
162. Id. at 769 (The Court vacated Fanfan's sentence).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 771-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens was joined in part by Justices
Souter and Scalia).
165. Id. at 771.
166. Id. at 772.
167. Id. at 774-76.
168. ld. at 773.
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These numbers would also shrink due to defendants who waive their
right to a jury trial and defendants who plead guilty to all facts. 169 Justice
Stevens had faith that the government would handle correctly the minor-
ity of defendants whose sentences involve Sixth Amendment issues. 70
Justice Stevens then went on to refute the Breyer majority's reason-
ing for rejecting the minority's remedy. 171 Justice Stevens' main idea
was that while the minority's remedy would, without a doubt, affect
some cases; the Breyer majority's remedy would affect every case.
172
Congress' main purpose was to have a mandatory guideline system, so
how could the Court ever think Congress would prefer an advisory sys-
tem to a mandatory system? 173 Congress rejected many other types of
systems, including advisory systems, and so its intent was clear that to
remove disparity, Congress wanted to remove judicial discretion. 74 The
Breyer majority's remedy removed the uniformity that the Breyer major-
ity said was Congress' intent. 75 In addition, the Breyer majority's hold-
ing positioned the sentencing system in a pre-reform state without the
mitigating benefit of parole.1
76
2. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, like Justice Stevens, dissented from the Breyer ma-
jority's remedy. 177 According to Justice Scalia, the Breyer majority had
placed the federal courts in the position the courts were in before the
Guidelines, but with a different standard of review. 78 On this subject,
Justice Scalia asked, "[W]hen the Court has severed that standard of re-
view... does it make any sense to look for some congressional 'impli-
cation' of a different standard of review in the remnants of the statute
that the Court has left standing? Only in Wonderland."'' 79 Under this
"reasonableness" standard of review, Justice Scalia feared either that the
appellate courts would find all sentences reasonable or that the appellate
courts would simply follow the Guidelines. 80  Either way, sentences
would undoubtedly become disparate.' 81 In the end, the Breyer major-
ity's remedy was ironic because "[i]n order to rescue from nullification a
169. Id. at 774.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 779-82.
172. Id. at 789.
173. Id. at 785-86.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 787.
176. Id. at 788.
177. Id. at 789 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 791.
179. Id. at 793.
180. Id. at 794.
181. Id.
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statutory scheme designed to eliminate discretionary sentencing, [the
Court] discards the provisions that eliminate discretionary sentencing.'
' 82
3. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer dissented from the Stevens majority holding that the
Sixth Amendment forbids a sentencing judge to determine sentencing
factors without a jury.18 3 Traditionally, federal law has allowed judges to
determine sentencing factors by a preponderance of the evidence.
184
Aside from finding the Stevens majority's history analysis unpersuasive,
Justice Breyer brought up two other reasons against this holding.
185
First, Justice Breyer distinguished between statutes and administrative
guidelines.18 6 The Guidelines only guide, they do not create a new set of
sentences so much as they reflect and organize pre-Guidelines sen-
tences. 8 7  Second, Justice Breyer asserted that the Guidelines do not
impose absolute constraints on federal judges.188 The Guidelines permit
a judge to depart from the Guidelines based on facts that constitute ele-
ments of the crime. 189  Overall, Justice Breyer found Apprendi and
Blakely distinguishable from Booker.'9"
III. ANALYSIS
The Breyer majority's holding in United States v. Booker 91 has left
Congress with advisory Guidelines; but, if Congress wishes to change
the sentencing system back to a mandatory one, it is forced to comply
with the Stevens majority's Sixth Amendment holding. 192 Congress must
decide whether to leave the system in its current state, or to change the
system. 193 No matter the course Congress chooses, this outcome leaves
the federal system with a wonderful opportunity to evaluate all options
and choose the best route.
Congress' best option would be to abandon the current sentencing
system because the advisory Guidelines are not in line with Congres-
182. Id. at 790. Justice Thomas also dissented from the Breyer majority's holding. Id. at 795
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas criticized Justice Breyer's severability analysis. Id. Jus-
tice Thomas explained that normally in a severability decision, the action is only invalidated for the
application of the litigant. Id. In this case, severability analysis can apply, but the statute is not
facially invalid, only invalid as to Booker's application. Id at 798-99.
183. Id. at 802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Breyer was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. These same four justices had consistently dissented
in Apprendi, Blakely and the similar line of cases).
184. Id. at 803.
185. Id. at 804-07.
186. Id. at 805.
187. Id. at 806.
188. Id. at 806-07.
189. Id. at 807.
190. Id.
191. 125 S. Ct. 738, 757 (2005).
192. Katie M. McVoy, Note, "What I Have Feared Most Has Now Come To Pass": Blakely,
Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1613, 1621 (2005).
193. Kalar, supra note 18, at 18.
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sional intent and the review standard of "reasonable" is not sufficient.1 94
If Congress chooses to change the sentencing system, there are three
realistic alternatives: (1) a Booker-ized form of the Guidelines using bi-
furcated juries; (2) a mandatory guideline system that avoids the use of
bifurcated juries by using a complex charge system; or (3) a simple
charge system where each crime has one sentence and the judge can use
mitigating factors to individualize a sentence. 195 Although the current
system seems to work and judicial discretion is presently stable, there is
no guarantee that judicial discretion will remain constant in the future.'
96
For this reason and many more, it is clear that a bifurcated jury system
will best serve Congress' original goals for the Guidelines while also
maintaining their constitutionality.
A. The Guidelines Post-Booker
As the Guidelines are now, post-Booker, Congress has yet to truly
see how an advisory system will pan out. Some federal judges are em-
bracing their expanded discretion while others are doing their best to
stick to the Guidelines. 197 United States v. Ranum198 and United States v.
Wilson'99 are examples of how different courts have used their new dis-
cretionary powers. In Ranum, the judge decided that the Guidelines are
now just one of a number of sentencing factors to consider.200 Pre-
Booker, the defendant in Ranum would have received a sentence of
thirty-seven to forty-five months, but instead the judge sentenced him for
one year, based on many mitigating factors. 20 1 On the other hand, in
Wilson, the judge considered the Guidelines as presumptive unless there
are unusual reasons to sentence outside of them.20 2
Further evidence of how judges are treating an advisory system
comes from the Commission itself and its studies.20 3 In June and August
of 2005, the Commission released data of the percentage of offenders
sentenced within the Guidelines after the Booker ruling.20 4 In June 2005,
judges had sentenced 61.7% of all offenders in the federal system within
194. See infra, Part 11I.B.
195. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2554-58 (2004).
196. See Ben Trachtenberg, Note, State Sentencing Policy and New Prison Admissions, 38 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 479, 508 (2005) (describing the North Carolina system in which judicial discre-
tion slowly increased in an advisory system).
197. Kalar, supra note 18, at 12, 14.
198. 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
199. 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005).
200. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
201. Id. at 989.
202. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
203. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT
(2005), http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_060605Extract.pdf [hereinafter June CODING
PROJECT] (data extracted as of June 6, 2005); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL
POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT (2005), http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker 080805.pdf
[hereinafter July CODING PROJECT] (cases extracted as of July 12, 2005).
204. June CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1; July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1.
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the Guidelines; and in August of 2005, judges had sentenced 61.3% of all
offenders within the Guidelines.2 °5 The percentage of offenders sen-
tenced within the Guidelines only differed by 5-10% when compared to
the fiscal years of 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.206 These numbers show
that the majority of judges may continue to sentence offenders within the
Guidelines, but six months of data cannot be conclusive.20 7 The decrease
in judges sentencing within the Guidelines could continue until the sys-
tem resembles sentencing before the 1984 reform.208 Most likely, as
soon as Congress sees a definite indication of a return to judicial discre-
tion, it will impose a new system or changes to the current system.
2 9
B. The Current Sentencing System
The easiest route for Congress is to keep the advisory Guidelines
system. There is nothing inherently wrong with an advisory system;
however, Congress has concerns with judicial discretion. 2 0  As said
above, the advisory system has shown a steady adherence to the Guide-
lines for the first six months post-Booker, but it is hard to estimate how
long that adherence will last.211 In addition, although the nationwide
percentage of adherence to the Guidelines has only decreased about eight
percent, some districts have substantially decreased adherence to the
Guidelines.21 2 For instance, the adherence to the Guidelines in the First
and Second Circuits has decreased by fifteen percent.21 3 Looking at the
history of federal sentencing and state systems that have advisory guide-
lines, there is a good chance that these trends will continue in the federal
system.2 14
Aside from the chance of decline in Guidelines adherence, the advi-
sory system is not in line with Congressional intent.215 "Congress' basic
goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the sentencing system in
the direction of increased uniformity. 216 To achieve this goal, Congress
passed the Sentencing Reform Act, which directed a mandatory sentenc-
ing system.217 If Congress had believed it could increase sentence uni-
formity through an advisory system, it would not have rejected models
205. June CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1; July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1.
206. June CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 5; July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 7
(in 2000, 64.5% were sentenced within the Guidelines; in 2001, 64%; in 2002, 65%; and in 2003,
69.4%).
207. See Trachtenberg, supra note 196, at 508.
208. Id.
209. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761.
210. Id. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. See June CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1; July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203,
at 1.
212. July CODING PROJECT, supra note 203, at 7.
213. id. at 7-8.
214. See supra Part I.A.
215. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761.
216. Id. at 761; see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) and § 994(f).
217. Yellen, supra note 15, at 167.
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for advisory guidelines systems in the past. 21 8  Therefore, if Congress
makes a change to the current sentencing system in the future, it would
most likely choose a mandatory system over an advisory one.219
In addition, the system has an insufficient appellate review standard
of "unreasonable[ness]," which leaves too much room for discretion.22 °
Although 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) 22' mandates that the court explain its rea-
soning for a sentence, some judges may submit vague explanations.222
Justice Scalia notes in his dissent to Booker that the requirement for
courts to evaluate each sentence individually for reasonableness could
lead to two different reactions from appellate courts.223 The courts could
"seek refuge in the familiar and continue . . . the 'appellate sentencing
practice during the last two decades.,, 224 Alternatively, the courts may
approve almost any sentence within the statutory range, as long as the
district judge complied with the formalities.225 Justice Scalia predicts a
"discordant symphony" of standards ranging from court to court.
226
Overall, the reasonableness standard is not sufficient for fair and compe-
tent appellate review.
Furthermore, in general, advisory guideline sentencing systems
have specific problems. First, appellate review standards under advisory
guidelines are usually more nebulous. 7 Second, judges are less likely to
follow a complicated sentencing scheme if they do not have to.228 Fi-
nally, an advisory system weakens a defendant's plea bargaining power
when they have no certainty that the judge will give a specific sentence
to a plea of a certain crime.229 Thus, because the current system is not in
line with Congressional intent, has an insufficient review standard, and
has general sentencing problems, Congress should change the advisory
Guidelines.
218. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 783-84.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 794.
221. The statute states:
Presentence procedure for an order of notice. Prior to imposing an order of notice pursu-
ant to section 3555, the court shall give notice to the defendant and the Government that
it is considering imposing such an order. Upon motion of the defendant or the Govern-
ment, or on its own motion, the court shall - (1) permit the defendant and the Govern-
ment to submit affidavits and written memoranda addressing matters relevant to the im-
position of such an order; (2) afford counsel an opportunity in open court to address
orally the appropriateness of the imposition of such an order; and (3) include in its state-
ment of reasons pursuant to subsection (c) specific reasons underlying its determinations
regarding the nature of such an order.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(d) (2005)
222. Kalar, supra note 18, at 16.
223. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 794.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See McVoy, supra note 192, at 1629.
228. See id. at 1629-30.
229. Id.
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C. Options
Congress is left with a plethora of options ranging from leaving the
system as is to completely wiping the slate clean and starting fresh. Ac-
cording to the statistics mentioned above, Congress most likely has time
to delay before instituting any changes. 3° In fact, a group of United
States Attorneys and retired federal judge John S. Martin lobbied Con-
gress in March 2005 to ask Congress to "wait and see" before enacting
any new legislation. With this time, Congress should study the differ-
ent options before it.
Any realistic alternative for Congress will have certain aspects: the
new system must conform to the Booker holding,232 and it must have
appellate review. 33 If a system is not Booker compliant, then the Court
would immediately hold the system unconstitutional.234 The appeal stan-
dard is important for many reasons. First, district court judges sentence
offenders with the knowledge that the appellate court can review the
sentence to keep judicial discretion in check.235 When review is rare, as
in North Carolina, sentencing disparity will slowly increase, because
judicial discretion is unchecked.236 Second, "the opportunity for appel-
late review is important to the fairness of the judicial process and may do
much to preserve the legitimacy of that process in the eyes of liti-
gants. ,2 7 Congress, however, has the job to legislate and enact an appel-
late review statute; appellate review should not emerge from case law.238
One alternative to the current system is to adopt the remedy that the
Court rejected: to "Booker-ize" the existing Guidelines.2 39  In the
Booker-ized system, the jury does all fact-findings in cases where Booker
would apply, and the judge decides the appropriate sentence within the
Guidelines.2 40 This system would have bifurcated jury trials.24' After a
trial on the charges had occurred, the jury would decide any fact beyond
a reasonable doubt that would raise the sentence.242 Congress could de-
cide whether this right would be waivable; but because a defendant can
waive a normal jury trial, it would seem most likely that a defendant
230. See supra Part III.A.
231. Jack King, NACDL Leadership, Former U.S. Attorneys, Judge, Warn Congress on Perils
of Hasty Federal Sentencing 'Reform,' CHAMPION, Apr. 2005, at 6, 6.
232. McVoy, supra note 192, at 1621.
233. Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 247.
234. See McVoy, supra note 192, at 1621.
235. See Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 247 (discussing appellate review under an advisory
system).
236. Trachtenberg, supra note 196, at 508.
237. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment
Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53, 89 (1984).
238. Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 247. This Comment does not discuss how appellate
review will differ under each option due to a lack of substantive material on the topic.
239. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757; Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2554.
240. Gardina, supra note 1, at 389.
241. Id. at 390.
242. Id. at 390-91.
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could also waive this jury right.24 3 Though this would increase the bur-
den on the federal system, it would only affect a small number of tri-
als.24
Kansas currently uses a system that is most like the one proposed
for the federal system: the jury determines whether a fact is proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt, but the judge still decides what sentence to
impose.245 This system keeps the amount of bifurcated jury trials low
because the judge decides pre-trial what facts to introduce at trial, and
what facts to introduce during sentencing.246 Kansas also uses the same
jury for trial and sentencing.247 Most importantly, Kansas' bifurcated
jury trial system has been effective without serious monetary issues.248
There are, however, issues with a bifurcated jury system for sen-
tencing. First, the rules of evidence preclude the jury from hearing cer-
tain issues during the trial, although a judge uses those factors when sen-
249tencing. Congress may have to enact new rules of evidence to deter-
mine what the court should allow a jury to hear in each phase of the
trial.25° Second, Congress or the Commission would have to work out
basic jury issues such as hung juries for the sentencing phase.2 ' Third,
some critics say a bifurcated jury system will increase prosecutorial
252power. A plea of "not guilty" would force a defendant to take the
chance on what the jury will decide for two trials if he or she does not
bargain with the prosecutor.253 Yet, no matter what system is in place,
254there is an argument that it will increase prosecutorial power.
As a second option, Congress could reinstate the Guidelines as
mandatory; but instead of using bifurcated juries, all crimes would have a
complex system of elements to encompass all facts that would increase
the sentence of the offender.255 In this type of system, each crime would
have a multitude of elements such as: injury to the victim, type of
weapon used in the crime, and any drugs involved.256 This system would
only require a single jury; but necessitates that the jury return special
verdicts every time, which could make the process much more confus-
ing.257 In addition, the complex charge system would force a defendant
243. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 774, 776.
245. McVoy, supra note 192, at 1637.
246. Id. at 1637-38.
247. Id. at 1638.
248. Id. at 1641.
249. Id. at 1639-40.
250. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556.
251. See McVoy, supra note 192, at 1640.
252. Id. at 1639.
253. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
254. McVoy, supra note 192, at 1639.
255. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
256. Id. at 2554-5.
257. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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to make claims of innocence, while also proving a lesser crime.25 8 For
example, the defendant would have to argue, "I did not sell drugs, and if
I did, I did not sell more than 500 grams.5
2 59
In this type of system, there would be no aggravating or mitigating
factors, only elements of the crime.260 Although there are many factors
for each crime, these factors cannot encompass everything because no
two criminals or crimes are exactly alike. 26 1 As an example, two men
rob a convince store, both steal $500 and both use a gun in the rob-
bery.2 62 Assuming both men have similar criminal histories, there is no
guarantee that both men are equally culpable.2 63 One man may rob the
store to sustain his cocaine habit while the other man stole because his
family would otherwise starve.26 4
A third option is a simple charge system where the judge would
sentence an offender to the maximum statutory sentence. 265 The judge
would then apply a multitude of mitigating factors to decrease the sen-
tence appropriately. 266 This simple charge system would not require a
267 wol lo icein 268 thbifurcated jury, and would allow judicial discretion. In addition, the
legislature would not have to rewrite most criminal statutes, as they al-
ready contain maximum sentences.269
Nevertheless, a simple charge system is also only an evasion of the
Booker holding.270 Furthermore, the system reverses the ordinary bur-
dens of proof in criminal cases; 27' the defendant would have the burden
to prove any mitigating factors.272 Furthermore, a fixed sentence for a
crime could increase prosecutorial power because the prosecutor could
273manipulate the charge. Another problem with this system would be
that if defendants could not prove many mitigating factors, the system
274may have too much uniformity and not enough individualization.
258. Id. at 557-58.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 555-56.
261. See McVoy, supra note 192, at 1622 (discussing mandatory sentencing systems).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2558 (Breyer, J. dissenting); Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 262-
63.
266. Yellen, supra note 15, at 177.
267. See id. (stating that the fact-finding could be performed by a judge).
268. See id.
269. See Jason Amala & Jason Laurine, Comment, An Exceptional Case: How Washington
Should Amend Its Procedure for Imposing an Exceptional Sentence in Response to Blakely v. Wash-
ington, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1127 (2005).
270. See Yellen, supra note 15, at 175-77 (discussing different "evasion" sentencing system
options for Congress).
271. Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 263.
272. Yellen, supra note 15, at 177.
273. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
274. Id.
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D. Proposal
From the proposed options, there is no choice without flaws or dif-
ficult decisions. When evaluated closely, however, Congress will hope-
fully see that one choice is the better option. The remedy Congress
should adopt is a Booker-ized form of the Guidelines using a system of
jury fact-finding and judicial sentencing. There are three main reasons
for this choice: (1) the degree of complexity, (2) prosecutorial power,
275and (3) judicial discretion. After assessment, the bifurcated jury sys-
tem would be the most effective choice.
1. Degree of Complexity
Both the bifurcated jury system and the complex charge system are
intricate sentencing schemes.276 Both systems require the jury to under-
stand and make decisions on many more factors than any past system.277
According to Justice Breyer, there are just too many factors to submit
them all to the jury.278 The bifurcated jury system also comes with addi-
tional complexities such as second indictments and new federal rules of
evidence. 279 However, the bifurcated jury system would also come with
an option for the defendant to waive his or her right to a bifurcated
jury.
2 8 0
The court would also only use the bifurcated jury system in a small
amount of trials.281 To begin with, over 95% of federal criminal prosecu-
tions are plea-bargained.28 2 This means that a jury would use either sys-
tem in only 3 to 5% of all federal criminal prosecutions. 283 Only half of
those federal criminal prosecutions, however, have sentencing enhance-
ments. 284 While the court would only use the bifurcated jury for sentenc-
ing enhancements,28 5 the court would use the complex charge system for
every case.286
275. Id. at 2554-58.
276. Id. at 2554, 2558.
277. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
278. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557.
279. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
280. Id. at 2541.
281. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
283. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 20 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/Fig-c.PDF (chart showing
that since 2000, over 95% of charges result in a plea bargain); however, just because the jury is not
dealing with a complex charge system does not mean that the prosecutor and the judge would have
to use the system every time.
284. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 772 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
285. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing how a jury fact-finding re-
quirement would only apply to a minority of cases).
286. See generally, Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compro-
mises Upon Which they Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 10 (1988) (discussing the basic system and
how "courts" use this system).
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The complex charge system has other, unique complexities, The
legislature would have difficulty writing the criminal statutes because
each charge has multiple elements to determine and define.287 As stated
above, this system would also require defendants to prove innocence at
the same time as disproving other criminal elements.288
The simple charge system is a somewhat less complex system.
Criminal statutes already contain maximum sentences, but Congress
would have difficulty creating the list of permissible mitigating fac-
tors.289 As Justice O'Connor has noted, the difference between a mitigat-
ing and aggravating factor is usually "in the eye of the beholder., 290 In
addition, the court would use this type of sentencing system in every
prosecution unless the prosecutor accepted the truth of the mitigating
factor without a hearing. 291 Overall, the simple charge system is less
complex, but the bifurcated jury system affects the least number of cases.
2. Prosecutorial Power
In the bifurcated jury system, prosecutorial power is most likely to
292decrease. A prosecutor who faces a longer, bifurcated jury trial could
offer a desirable plea bargain to the defendant.293 Defendants may not
trust a jury determination and instead choose to plea bargain,294 but the
threat of a bifurcated trial should at least even the playing field.
The amount of prosecutorial power in a complex charge system is
harder to determine. The prosecutor would control the charge by deter-
mining which of many elements to indict.295 The prosecutor could then
engage in "charge bargaining." 296 In addition, the prosecutor may have
to decide which elements to charge the defendant with before discover-
ing or evaluating all the evidence.297 On the other hand, if the prosecutor
charges the defendant with many elements and the defendant does not
plead guilty, the prosecutor may face a long, drawn out trial.298 Each
element a prosecutor must prove only extends the length of the trial and
287. Id. at 558-59.
288. Id. at 557.
289. See Amala & Laurine, supra note 269, at 1127.
290. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 542-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
291. See Amala & Laurine, supra note 269, at 1138.
292. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2557 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
293. Id. at 2556.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2555.
296. Id.; Joy Anne Boyd, Comment, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of Justice's
Plea Bargain Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor's Power Under the United States Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 595 (2004) (describing "charge bargaining" as a form of plea
bargaining in which the prosecutor would agree to drop certain charges if the defendant agrees to
plea guilty to other charges).
297. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
298. Id. at 2542 (majority opinion).
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increases the likelihood that a prosecutor will offer a better plea bar-
gain. 99
In a simple charge system, the prosecutor would also have the
power to "charge bargain., 30 0 Because each charge carries a maximum
penalty, the crime a prosecutor charges a defendant with could greatly
affect the sentence. 30 1 In addition, because this system reverses the bur-
den of proof, the prosecutor does not have to prove anything except that
the crime itself was committed.30 2 The Court in Booker also notes that
any options such as these are only available because of the heavy reli-
ance in our system on plea-bargaining.30 3 Therefore, the bifurcated jury
system shows the most promise in decreasing prosecutorial power.
3. Discretion
In terms of judicial discretion, the bifurcated jury system and the
complex charge system come out almost evenly. After the jury deter-
mines which facts are true beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge will still
have discretion to sentence the offender within the Guidelines.30 4 In the
case of the bifurcated jury system, however, the judge would also have
the decision to increase the sentence above the Guidelines, although the
Guidelines would never require a judge to do so.
30
5
In the simple charge system, the judge may have too much discre-
tion. The judge has the option to apply any appropriate mitigating fac-
tors and would have the option to decrease the sentence. 30 6 Unless the
Commission was to give specific decreases in the sentence for each find-
ing of mitigation, it would allow the judge a great deal of discretion to
determine how much to decrease the sentence.30 7 In addition, a simple
charge system has no framework for appellate review.30 8 Thus, a bifur-
cated jury system or complex charge system would allow the appropriate
amount of judicial discretion.
Therefore, after a full evaluation of the three options, Congress
should choose the bifurcated jury system. The system is complex, but
not so much that it is not worth the trade-off of fairness to defendants. In
Blakely, the Court states that
The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, be-
fore depriving a man of [ten] more years than his liberty, the State
299. Id.
300. Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
301. Id.
302. Train Wreck, supra note 107, at 263.
303. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
304. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
305. McVoy, supra note 192, at 1638.
306. Amala & Laurine, supra note 269, at 1129.
307. Id. at 1129.
308. Id. n.71.
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should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation
to 'the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors,'
rather than a lone employee of the State.
309
In addition, prosecutorial power and judicial discretion are more stable in
the bifurcated jury system. 310 Although this system is not perfect, it is
the most fair system that is in accord with Congressional intent and com-
plies with Booker.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Booker,311 the Stevens majority succeeded in up-
holding a basic constitutional right for criminal defendants: courts should
not increase a defendant's sentence unless a jury of his or her peers finds
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all facts.3 12  The
Breyer majority, however, instead of allowing criminal defendants to
benefit from this constitutional right, found a loophole: an advisory sen-
tencing system. Although the Breyer majority did an eloquent job of
attempting to convince everyone that an advisory system fits best with
Congressional intent and is better than a Booker-ized system, in reality,
the holding only evaded providing defendants with their constitutional
right to a jury trial on all facts.
Nonetheless, "[t]he ball now lies in Congress' court."'3 13 Whether
Congress wanted the opportunity or not, it now has the job of deciding
how to play the ball served by the Supreme Court. When Congress
evaluates the options, it should not only look at issues like the degree of
complexity, prosecutorial power, judicial discretion, and many more; it
should also not lose focus of the constitutional right Booker upheld for
defendants. Although a bifurcated jury system is not a perfect sentencing
system, it is more fair to the defendant and staves off a concern than that
has existed almost as long as the United States: that the "jury right could
be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion. '3 14
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